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The ecosystem services movement was a reaction
against nature being taken for granted in decision making. Put a value on the services that we enjoy from ecosystems and there is a better chance of showing their
importance in economic and social development (Norgaard 2010). Yet there are still concerns that the monetization of these services is at best inappropriate and
at worst flawed on ethical grounds and in terms of basic principles (Kapustka and McCormick 2015). Here, I
argue that these views are missing the point about the
need for a transparent approach to valuation.
The first argument for monetization arises directly
from the desire to show the worth of ecosystems. Putting constraints on the ways we use ecosystems in the
economy, for raw materials and as a repository for
wastes, by definition involves extra costs for producers and consumers alike. These are easily monetized
and often appear as large costs for industry and society. Stating the benefits of protecting ecosystems in
terms of money provides a convincing way of showing
the importance of ecosystem services in the comparison of these costs and benefits.
A second argument for monetization arises from the
need to capture public preferences in a transparent
way—this follows from a basic proposition of welfare
(neoclassical) economics that what matters in policy
making is finding ways to enhance the welfare (sometimes called utility) of individuals within society. There
are other possible policy aspirations that are sometimes
confused with this focus on the individual. One is that
there are societal values that can sometimes override
individual values. These are the kinds of values that
governments are supposed to take into account when
making policy. However, in the human health context
for example, the obvious difference between society putting a value on our lives as compared with capturing
the value that we put on our own lives draws attention
to the possible dangers with this kind of approach. Another assertion is that policies ought to take into account the intrinsic values that reside in nature. However, these values often turn out to be the values of

those promoting the approach or are intended to make
nature so valuable that no development would ever be
possible.
Preferences and values are made most transparent when we trade in markets and the presumption
from economics is that those trades will lead to a better
state in terms of welfare. Some environmental goods
are traded in markets such as commodities that include lumber and fish. However, most are not (they
are so-called externalities) and the many techniques
for capturing the way that we value these are aimed at
making explicit our preferences transparently, in a way
that can be used effectively in weighing the costs and
benefits of environmental policy interventions (Hanley and Barbier 2009). Money is the index of utility
and provides a common currency for the trade-off arguments. Methods are developing for capturing utility
directly, but these techniques are at an early stage and
the results cannot easily be used in cost-benefit comparisons (Krueger and Stone 2014).
There are well known challenges for capturing nonmarket values and using them as a better basis for environmental policy (Hanley and Barbier 2009). For example, valuation techniques, especially those that ask
about willingness to pay for ecosystem services, make
the presumption that those asked know enough ecology
to provide rational responses. This is why ecosystem
service approaches are increasingly framed in terms
of final outcomes (e.g., clean drinking water, ability to
fish and swim) rather than the complex ecological properties and processes that are behind them. Alternatively, when asked about hypothetical willingness to
pay, which does not involve a hard cash transaction,
people seem to overvalue ecological goods and services,
and this certainly needs more research.
Kapustka and McCormick (this issue) raise even
more fundamental concerns about the market model:
that markets often fail to deliver because of externalities and this leads to the overexploitation of nature, that we do not operate as rationally as we should
in making decisions based on preferences, and that
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aggregating across the people affected misses the point
that some of these will be winners and some losers thus
leading to increased inequality. However, the whole
aim of the ecosystem services approach is to internalize ecological externalities so that they are not forgotten in policy development; this should have the effect of
reducing not enhancing exploitation. Although behavioral economics is demonstrating deviations from some
of the core assumptions of the neoclassical model, it is
unclear how significant these are in terms of magnitude and pervasiveness (Robinson and Hammitt 2011).
Finally, on inequality the presumption is that accumulating wealth is good because in principle the winners
can compensate losers thus raising overall welfare; but,
as noted by Piketty (2014), addressing this distributional challenge has to be a matter for governments.
Not all will want to accept a form of decision making that is based on the preferences of the individuals
affected, even though it is fundamentally empowering.
There are alternative models that seek to emphasize
the limits that nature puts on economic development
and this includes economic ecology (Kapustka and McCormick this issue). However, decisions still have to
be made about what those limits mean for the economy and on balancing the inevitable tradeoffs between
our activities and the environment. This begs the questions of who makes those decisions and how. Some
might say let the ecologists decide, but as they move
from the science (what is) to policy (what ought to be),

value judgments will be exercised that need not coincide with those of the public at large. Others might argue for more government, but this inevitably involves
politics that can cloud decisions. Yet others argue for a
more spiritual approach, but intrinsic values are elusive. If the aim is to base decisions on what people want
from ecosystems, in a way that can be weighed transparently against the costs of protecting ecosystem services, then monetization is something that should be
embraced rather than avoided in taking the ecosystem
services approach forward.
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